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A PSYCHIATRIST LOOKS AT PSYCHIATRY ANDTHE LAW
FREDRic WERTEAM, M. D.*
Psychiatry and the Law is presented to us with a claim of
considerable magnitude. On the jacket it is described as "a unique
and indispensable guide". In the Foreword we are promised
"a deeper and clearer perspective". The latter phrase is not
without significance, for a perspective should as a rule be not
deep but wide. The book is written jointly by a legal authority
on the subject and a psychiatrist. That in itself is a good idea
and the authors are correct in stating that this gives the book its
''special value". There is, however, the difficulty that the reader
does not know which portions are written by whom. It is to be
presumed that the psychiatric parts are written by the psychiatrist.
There are altogether nineteen chapters. They deal with or
touch upon almost every phase of the subject. Gotten out by an
excellent publisher, the book is well printed, has an index and a
list of Cases Cited. In contrast to this formal persuasiveness,
the text itself has grave shortcomings. I consider it important
to point out some of them because it can be safely predicted that
this book, already well on its way to being regarded as authorita-
tive, will do a great deal of harm to a lot of unfortunate people.
What does one expect from such a book from the psychiatric
point of view? First of all, an exposition of the well-established
data of clinical psychiatry, especially with regard to diagnosis,
symptomatology and prognosis. That must be the foundation of
any discussion of the application of psychiatric knowledge to legal
procedure. Such data exist; they are as much beyond debate
and conjecture as the well-established data of internal medicine.
Many lawyers-and some psychiatrists-do not know that such a
body of clear-cut facts exists and that it is based on painstaking
research. They will not learn it from this book, for here the well-
established, the probable and the conjectural are mixed. The
very atmosphere of confusion between the certain and the assumed
that we deplor6 i. the courtroom when psychiatric experts con-
.tend with one another,- permeates this book.
Psychiatrists are apt to object to the fact that the law in the
field of mental disorders makes a sharp distinction between legal
insanity and legal sanity. That-puts psychiatry under the obli-
gation to explain to the legal profession how science classifies
mental diseases. The classification of mental diseases nowadays
* Practicing New York Psychiatrist and Member of the American Medical"
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is in essentials the same in this country and practically all others.
It has -withstood the test of time and clinical experiment. It was
worked out by the psychiatrist Kraepelin and is based on a num-
ber of theoretical principles. It was only with the introduction
of the Kraepelinian system that a truly' scientific collaboration
between psychiatry and the law became possible. But these mat-
ters are not clearly set forth here and without this, the application
of present day clinical psychiatry to the law cannot be fully under-
stood. This book states that "the concept of a manic-depressive
is a confusing one". It is not at all, if one explains concretely
and.in detail why Kraepelin introduced this term to clarify a pre-
viously confused and obscure field of psychopathology. It is true
that there have been interesting and in my opinion largely valid
psychoanalytic theories about this disease. But they are still
conjectural and they lie entirely on the periphery as far as prac-
tical medico-legal questions are concerned. They refer to the
finer psychological structure of the disease. The average dura-
tion of manic-depressive attacks is not accurately given. The
extravagant claim is made that "electro-shock therapy is almost
specific* for manic-depressive psychosis ",--a claim which for for-
ensic discussion is certainly misleading.
Having called the term manic-depressive confusing, the
authors find schizophrenia, which is the name of the most common
psychosis, "sufficiently enigmatic". It is enigmatic only since
they define it wrongly as meaning "splitting of the mind"' That
is not what Bleuler, who introduced the term, meant by it. They
state that the definition of schizophrenia as "the progressive mal-
adaptation of the individual to his environment seems at least
philosophically sound". I think it is hopelessly vague. There are
all sorts and conditions of man where progressive maladjustment
occurs which are surely not schizophrenic.
It is strange to find in a book on legal psychiatry that the dif-
ferentiation of "paranoid schizophrenia, paranoia and the para-
noid states . . . has no significant practical value .2 In many
cases the differentiation of paranoid states and schizophrenia is
one of the key issues. The term paraphrenia should also have been
discussed in this connection. Of paranoid delusions, a crucial
psychopathological phenomenon, the authors say that the patients
feel "that the whole world" . . . is "hostile". 3 That is incorrect
and a layman's way of speaking. Here a real and exact discus-
sion of delusions would have been necessary. Van Gogh was not
1. Gu rmACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 73 (1952).
2. Id. at 76.
3. Ibid.
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a schizophrenic, "fully fledged" or otherwise, but an epileptic, as
careful research has proved. Nor is Ezra Pound a schizophrenic.
If this case is mentioned at all, the whole blatantly inadequate
psychiatric report to the court should have been mentioned, too.
Obsessive-compulsive neurosis is an important condition in
the discussion of any psychology of action. Psychoanalysis made
one of its greatest contributions in elucidating this disease. But
the authors define it wrongly. They say that "the patient has some
dominant fear or worry . . ." ' In a most severe form of ob-
sessive-compulsive neurosis the patient may not show any fear
or worry. He may enter the doctor's room inconspicuously wiping
off the doorknob with a handkerchief so as not to be infected by
germs. This act may have become so automatic for him that the
very absence of fear may be what is characteristic and malig-
nant. Supposing that I would testify to this elementary clinical
fact in a courtroom and the cross-examiner would say: "Don't
you know that Guttmacher and Weihofen say the opposite?"
I would have to prove that this is not an authoritative text.
Instead of making clear the details of the relationship between
compulsions and other impulses, the authors hide behind the alibi
that this "would involve technical considerations too abstruse
for a work of this type."' And they confuse the who.e issue by
throwing together pyromania, kleptomania, exhibitionism and a
dash: of "irresistible impulse." 0 Speaking of "true kleptomania"
does not make it any better, for they do not explain what false
kleptomania would be. It must be added that there is excellent
literature on this whole subject which is not mentioned
We are not much better off in the information we are given
about psychopathic personalities. The authors state that the
"incapacity to" conduct oneself 'with decency and propriety in
the business of life' is the outstanding characteristic of the true
psychopath." 7 I do not see how either a psychiatrist or a lawyer
can do anything with such a definition. In the further discussion
no clear distinction seems to be made between neurotic character,
neurosis and psychopathic personality. For example, they say
that "most sex offenders suffer from anti-social neurotic charac-
ter disorders." 8
A whole page is devoted to an illness which does not exist,
the Ganser syndrome or "true Ganser syndrome," which the
4. Id. at 55.
5. Id. at 56.
6. Id. at 57.
7. Id. at 87.
8. Id. at 100.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
authors assume was quite common in Germany formerly. There
is no single case studied with modern methods which would bear
out that this is in any sense a clinical entity. The discussion of
malingering-a condition that is in the mind of every lawyer'and
juror-is wholly inadequate. The authors make the statement
that "certain unstable individuals have the ability to let themselves
drift into- a . . . quasi-psychotic condition." 9 This is doubletalk
and it is not where psychiatry ends but where psychiatry should
begin. Without any documentation, the authors state that "most
malingerers . . . have a seriously warped, neurotic character
structure."" To the extent that this is meaningful, it is con-
trary to my experience both in peace and war. In discussing
neurasthenia, another condition in which psychoanalysis and
psychosomatic medicine have done so much, this book says: "A
high proportion of the cases occur in rather generally inadequate
individuals." Can a psychiatrist be more vague than that, lump-
ing together groups of people and berating them as "rather
generally inadequate" ? This is precisely the kind of thing which
brings psychiatry into disrepute.
With regard to heredity the authors summarize the findings of
.Lange, who tried to prove the hereditary causation of crime by
studies of twins. I had occasion to see the original material on
which this claim was based. The cases were inadequately studied
and the data are not only inconclusive, but tend to prove, if any-
thing, the opposite of what Lange tried to show.
The very first sentence of the book is wrong. It states that
psydiatry has made "far greater progress" during "the past
quarter century" than in any similar period in history. Later
the statement is made that prior to the beginning of the twentieth
century there was only "vague terminology,". "confusion and
ignorance."" But Kraepelin and Freud made their most impor-
tant contributions, especially as far as any legal application is
concerned, before 1900-which is well over half a century ago.
The alleged great recent advance of psychiatry is contrasted by
the authors with "the slow pace of legal change." But their proof
is not substantial.
They speak of the improvement in the procedure for commit-
ment of mental patients. That may be true for some localities; but
it is not correct as a whole. In the largest psychiatric city hos-
pital in the United States, from which very many patients are
committed, the procedure is anything but modern. Judges of the
9. Id. at 42.
10. Id. at 55.
11. Id. at 6.
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Supreme Court go into the hospital and sit in judgment in clinical
matters of psychiatric determination which they do not know
and cannot know. I know of shameful errors and injustices that
have been done in this way. It is entirely unnecessary for judges
to go to the hospital at all. Whole series of patients have been
committed from this hospital by competent and humane psychia-
trists without any need of a court hearing. The procedure of
having a judge routinely sit in judgment over a sick man in a hos-
pital was introduced during the "past quarter century" at a time
when the psychiatric management of this hospital was in a par-
ticularly deplorable state.
As further proof of the recent progress of psychiatry, the
authors adduce "the recognition of sexual psychopathy." Is
that something to boast about? We have known for a long time
how to treat patients with sexual difficulties by psychotherapy
and many can be helped, as we found in the Quaker Emergency
Service Readjustment Center. But at present only an infinitesimal
proportion of sex offenders who do not have money for expensive
treatment can get any treatment worth speaking of, even if they
seek it long before they have any trouble with the law. Consider-
able space is devoted to a discussion of sex offenders. But the
fundamental fact is left but that many sex offenders are harmless
homosexuals. Instead of a lot of medicolegal hairsplitting, it
would have been better to have a frank discussion of why people
are punished instead of being helped.
The third proof is the "official psychiatric clinics" to advise
the courts. There are very few of them. More important, the
work done in some of those that do exist is sometimes slipshod.
In the largest clinic of this type, the psychiatrists were given only
half an hour to examine a prisoner, whether his crime was murder
or anything else. On thebasis of this examination reports were
made to the courts. If a conscientious psychiatrist asked for a
little more time or for permission to see a prisoner a second time,
it was refused. These rules were made not by the courts but by
psychiatrists.
If we want to improve the relation between psychiatry and
the law, psychiatrists have to be a little more humble and self-
critical The authors state of court psychiatrists that "results
have been particularly good in juvenile cases." Does the present
status of'juvenile delinquency bear this out? Where are the fol-
low-up studies that alone could prove this? It would have been
more accurate to say that good results could be obtained, and have
been obtained in numerically insignificant instances.
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The authors say that they do not wish to dwell on "the flawsin legal psychiatry." That is perfectly justified. But is it pos-
sible to disentangle the essence of their subject without a frank
critique of what is being done in psychiatry today? The dis-
crepancy between what is really being accomplished and what is
merely on paper has become too great for that. The authors
say that we must wait for "more exactness in medicine and psy-
chiatry. 1"'2 But that is a wrong emphasis. It would have beenfar more important to point out the many misuses and social
abuses of psychiatry which could be corrected right now.
The success of a book on forensic psychiatry must depend onthe concreteness and clearness of its formulations. This book has
too many generalizations which are anything but clearcut. We
are told that the concept of mental disease has been revolutionized(by whom?) and that "mental disorders are to-day viewed pri-
marily as failures in the socio-adaptive capacity of the indi-
vidual." If a psychiatric expert were asked in front of a jury
what mental disorder is and he gave that sort of a definition, no
one could blame the jurors if they found it too vague. If theyhave read the article on mental disease by Albert Q. Maisel in
the Ladies Home Journal'3 they would be accustomed to much
more scientific clarity. Other such generalizations: "Man istoday regarded as an integrated organism." So is a mouse.
"The basic personality structure is manifested in everything that
a person does." That is true of a sparrow, too; everything itdoes is based on what it fundamentally is. Such statements do
not help because they are platitudinous. As a matter of fact, if
one takes this sentence in a really concrete psychiatric case, it is
not even true. I have known men whose. "basic personality struc-ture" is decent, considerate and sympathetic. And yet under the
unfortunate concatenation of circumstances and of social pres-
sures they acted in fact contrary to their "Ibasic personality struc-
ture," if such a phrase can be properly defined at all.
Another such general statement: "A careful analysis of a
child of five makes it possible to project fairly accurately his
adult character." Where has that ever been done? Has anybody
ever foretold at the age of five the character of a Hitler, a Shakes-peare, an Edison, an Albert Fish or Robert Irwin? Psychiatrists
are not prophets, and as long as they claim that they are the law
will certainly have to surround their testimony with strict defini-
tions, restrictions and safeguards.
12. Id. at 12.13. Is Mental Disease Mental?. Ladies Home Journal, July 1953, p. 48.
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In all phases of psychiatric criminology there is at present
in practice considerable discrimination against Negroes. Instead
of pointing this out or acknowledging it, this book has a sugges-
tion of the same thing. We are supposed to believe that Negroes
are apt to have "mediocre intellectual endowments" and to be
"socially unsophisticated.""' Speaking of transitory abnormal
states in such prisoners, the authors refer to states of "emotional
numbness." What is that supposed to mean'? Such an expression
may be used in front of a jury to explain a more technical state-
ment; but in a textbook it is inappropriate, especially when fol-
lowed with the generalization-which certainly should not apply
to all such cases-that they are "generally held to be responsible
agents." The section on "normal criminals" gives Negroes as
examples.' 5 The authors speak of "inferior biological endow-
ment" and "racial patterns." In this section on "normal crimi-
nals" we also hear of a "servant" and of a "hillbilly moon-
shiner." Are there no "normal criminals" who are white, busi-
nessmen, politicians or professional men? The view that criminal
activity is just as much due to biological endowment as to the
environment is against the weight of modern scientific knowledge
and is socially unprogressive. We do not want to go back to
Lombroso, but forward from Freud. The function of psychiatry
is to help people individually and socially, and that cannot be
accomplished with such Nietzschean statements as "Our extensive
social welfare programs defeat the normal biological tendency
of the survival of the fittest."' 6
There are a number of full case reports, but they cannot be
regarded as models. They contain many details the relevance of
which is not evident and not indicated. It would have been neces-
sary in the end to tie these details together and make them
dynamically significant.
Some of the newer developments in psychopathology are not
considered at all. There-is no mention of the catathymic crisis.
Instead of discussing such attempts as psychodynamic understand-
ing of violent acts, the authors speak of murderers "who become
overwhelmed and overpowered by force of circumstances." Such
expressions are too general and modern psychiatrists attempt to
be more specific and dynamic. The mosaic test-almost indis-
pensable in the diagnosis of youthful schizophrenia and para-
phrenia-is not included.
14. GUTIACRER AND WE IHoEN, op. cit. uPra note 1, at 39.
15. Id. at 385.
16. Id. at 190.
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The book contains a lot of interesting and instructive legal
material. There is a considerable difference between the legal
and the psychiatric sections. The legal author's style is clearer,
more definite, less oblique and not so condescending. The psy-
chiatrist who looks for legal information will therefore find this
book far more enlightening than will the lawyer who looks for
definite psychiatric guidance.
The, authors make a number of recommendations for the
future. Whatever the merits of some of them, they suffer by and
large from a number of general defects. Just as a doctor cannot
prescribe the proper remedy if he has not made the proper diag-
nosis, so you cannot make recommendations for social conditions
unless you recognize their extent and seriousness. Wrong com-
mitments happen more often than the authors seem to admit. I
know of thousands of commitment papers made out after a few
minutes' examination. And I know state hospitals where patients
have not seen a doctor for two years. In the face of this, the
authors sayIT that "psychiatrists have come to be much more
interested in the therapeutic purposes of commitment than in
the merely custodial." Since when? The book's recommenda-
tions are too formalistic. They refer to the form rather than to
the content of what is being done. A lot of fuss is made about
legal safeguards of commitment and then in the model act the
patient is to be examined "at least once every six months." 18
What kind of safeguard and treatment is that?
There is in this book a bias to whitewash psychiatric procedure
on the one hand and to give. the psychiatrists far too much power.
I think it would be a calamitv if the disposition of criminal cases
would be taken out of the hands of judges and given into the
hands of psychiatric and other experts. The authors recommend
what they call "an ingenious table" for the psychiatrist"9 with
regard to disposition. According to this most primitive and for-
malistic scheme, the unfortunate defendants are divided into eight
categories. In six of these categories the psychiatrist advises
punishment or custody. Can that still be called psychiatry?
The authors disapprove of the current legal definition of
insanity. It is true that many psychiatrists object to being pinned
down to a yes or no answer. But I think it is a godsend that there
are at least some situations where psychiatrists are forced to
give a simple answer to a simple question. Social living, with
which the law deals, makes this necessary. Instead of the test
17. Id. at 294.
18. Id. at 313.
19. Id. at 396.
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of the "irresistible impulse" the authors suggest "inability to
adhere to the right."2 This would describe most people as well
as most murderers. There is room for critical discussion of the
different legal definitions of insanity. But this book is a good
example of the unfortunate tendency to emphasize this point asif it were the main trouble with present-day forensic psychiatric
usage. Instead of putting their own house in order, psychiatrists
like to claim that most, if not all, that is wrong are the legal defini-
tions. Throughout this book the impression is given that thelawyers are backward and psychiatrists progressive. 
-Many law-
yers, judges and district attorneys would like to get psycLiatric
advice and help, as well as treatment, for defendants. Their main
trouble is to get psychiatrists in cases where large fees are not
available. They have much less difficulty with other medical
specialities.
The authors maintain that "the courts have made this dis-
tinction between proof of mental disorder and proof of mentalirresponsibility, but have too frequently used the ambiguous word
'insanity' to refer to both." 21  When courts speak of insanity
they refer to legal insanity and that is defined for every court.
Are matters really as complicated and "ambiguous" as these
authors make them out? We psychiatrists do not like to call a
man "insane," just as we doctors do not like to call a man a
''cripple.'' But suppose a man has one leg shorter than the other
and limps as a result. A lay person can testify that he saw this
man limp and noticed his shorter leg and that therefore he regards
him as a cripple. That corresponds to a lay witness testifyingin court that a man talked irrationally. A doctor can also testify
that-a man is a cripple, if so required by a legal definition, although
he would not use that word in his daily practice. But he will sub-
stantiate his opinion by an exact orthopedic diagnosis, a discussion
of how the condition came about, how long it lasted, the precise
measurements of the deviation and the prognosis. That is theposition of the psychiatrist in court. He must give a yes or no
answer to the question of legal insanity; but he must also give a
scientific psychiatric diagnosis, discuss the symptoms of the con-
dition, its cause, pathology, course and prognosis. The trouble
with current forensic psychiatry is not that the psychiatrists are
prevented from being clear, understandable and down-to-earth by
the legal part of their testimony. The trouble comes with the
psychiatric part of -heir testimony, when they are required to give
a: straightforward statement without ambiguity about the mental
20. Id. at 411.
21. Id. at 415.
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disease involved. This book gives no help in this direction. It
uses as psychiatric characterizations expressions which are much
more unpsychiatric than any legal definition; e. g. "a borderline
mental case . . . may crack under the strain . . ." or "the ego
of the prisoner collapsed."
Among their suggestions for a new legal test of insanity is
the phrasing that the disorder "manifested itself by significantly
distorting social judgment." 2 2 That is an ambiguous phrase which
is not an improvement on anything. Impairment of judgment is
a well-defined clinical symptom; but what is "social judgment"?
And what is the difference between an impaired judgment and a
"distorting" one? And the word "significantly" is of course
the point at issue and is that question of fact which the jury has
to decide.
What the authors do not seem to see is that there is no funda-
mental difference between the interests of the individual and the
interests of society. We want to protect the victim; but we also
want to protect the murderer from becoming a murderer.
This book also embodies a threat to civil liberties. The authors
want to give power to a tribunal of experts and according to their
judgment "the person could be held as long as necessary, whether
that be for a few days or for the rest of his life." 2 3 Who
would check the experts,-their selection, their decision, their
promise that the prisoner will get treatment, what kind of treat-
ment he really gets, the criteria for recovery and the whole finan-
cial set-up and background? We already have the preposterous
situation where psychiatrists approve that homosexuals are in-
carcerated where they cannot have any contact with the other sex
and are treated by psychotherapy and kept until they have made
a good heterosexual adjustment! All that is unrealistic psychia-
try. The authors go so far24 that they want to eliminate the
defence of insanity entirely, which would lead us back to medieval
times.
I am most disappointed with the chapter on prevention. We
are regaled with the old stereotyped clich6s: "The seeds of most
mental disorders, of vice and crime, of alcoholism and perversion,
of brutality, hatred, miserliness, and innumerable other highly
unlovely traits are sown in the first years of childhood." Where
is the substantial proof of that? Where are the cases? Freud
showed that one root of adult neurosis goes back to early child-
22. Id. at 421.
23. Id. at 445.
24. Id. at 446.
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hood. He warned against applying this to delinquency. If all
the emphasis is placed on early childhood, all the social influences
which really mold a person's character and life are neglected.
That is the cancer of present-day hyper-individualistic psychiatry.
Instead of doing justice to social pressures that lead to crime, the
authors give us the "over-protective mothers" and recommend
birth control as a remedy against delinquency. =
The literature quoted is characterized by provincialism. -The
classical studies of European psychiatric criminology- are neglect-
ed. On the other hand, dubious modern writings are accepted at
face value. One can say of this book that, apart from the excel-
lent strictly factual legal material, it reflects well the chaos, the
injustice, the loose tinlking and the social unprogressiveness of
today's forensic psychiatry for children and adults. The remedy
for such a situation consists not in definitions but in deeds. Let
us practice the laws we have before making new ones. Let us be
less speculative and more scientific in psychiatry in general. Let
us treat abnormal adult and juvenile delinquents equitably and
in sufficient numbers; let us equalize a little bit the facilities for
the poor and the rich; let us put all emphasis on treatment and
prevention; let us give more attention to the individual and to
society before the crime rather than afterwards; let us get away
from both paid partisanship and bureaucratic officialdom. Then
the lawgivers will have no difficulty in codifying our good clinical
procedures.
25. Id. at 456.
